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A Modication to the Self-Certied Group-Oriented
Cryptosystem Without a Combiner
Indexing terms: Threshold Cryptography, Certied Public Keys
The authors propose a modied protocol which prevents the conspiracy attack de-
veloped by Susilo and Safavi-Naini on a self-certied group-oriented cryptosystem
without combiner
Introduction: A society-oriented cryptographic system is a protocol which al-
lows the distribution of the power of performing a cryptographic operation among
a group of participants. Society-oriented cryptographic systems can be classied
into two broad classes. If the membership of the group that performs the crypto-
graphic operation is anonymous, then the society-oriented cryptographic system
is called a threshold cryptographic system (even though the internal structure of
the group is not a threshold structure). On the other hand, if the membership
of the group is known, then the society-oriented cryptographic system is called a
group-oriented cryptographic system.
A group-oriented cryptosystem is implemented by the sender. It is at the
sender's discretion to create a subgroup P  U of users for whom he encrypts
a message. In addition, the sender determines a subgroup A  P of intended
receivers who are able to decrypt (collectively) a cryptogram generated by the
sender. The sender also determines the access policy in the intended group.
An interesting class of all access structures is the threshold access structure.
In a (t; n) group-oriented cryptosystem, collaboration of at least t participants is
required to perform the group transformation. Two important issues in imple-
mentation of such cryptosystems are:
1. the sender needs to collect authenticated public keys of the intended receiv-
ers;
2. the combiner needs a secure channel to collect (privately) the partial results
from collaborating participants.
In [1] the authors discussed relevant problems in implementation of such sys-
tems and proposed a (t; n) group-oriented cryptosystem that works with self-
certied public keys and does not need the help of a combiner. In [2] Susilo
and Safavi-Naini developed a conspiracy attack to the system, but they did not
determine how to x the problem. In this Letter, we show that the attack is
not as straightforward as mentioned in [2], that is, the attack is applicable only
in particular circumstances. We also present a small modication to the pro-
posed scheme that prevents this type of attack and in the meantime preserves
the main characteristics of the system. First we briey review the self-certied
group-oriented cryptosystem without a combiner and the conspiracy attack, then
we present the modication to the system.
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Self-certied group-oriented cryptosystem without a combiner: Let U = fU
1
; : : : ; U
`
g
be the collection of all users in the system, and let (without loss of generality)
P = fU
1
; : : : ; U
n
g (n  `) be the intended group. As in all self-certied schemes,
there exists a trusted authority who sets up the system.
Setup phase: The authority chooses:
(i) an integer N which is the product of two large distinct random primes p
and q of almost the same size such that p = 2p
0
+ 1 and q = 2q
0
+ 1, where
p
0
and q
0
are also prime integers,
(ii) a prime F > N ,
(iii) a base  6= 1 of order r = p
0
q
0
modulo N , and
(iv) a one-way hash function h, that outputs integers less than the minimum
value of p
0
and q
0
, that is, h(m) < min(p
0
; q
0
).
The authority makes , h, F and N public, keeps r secret and discards p and
q.
Key generation: Every legitimate user chooses his secret key x, computes the
shadow z = 
x
(mod N) and gives it to the authority. The authority rst inter-
rogates the user about his secret key. After the authority is convinced that the
user knows the secret key, he generates the user's public key as
y = (z
 1
  ID)
ID
 1
(mod N):
where ID = h(I), and I corresponds to the user's identity (such as his name, his
address, etc.)
Encryption: Suppose an individual wants to send a message 0  m < N to the
group P = fU
1
; : : : ; U
n
g, such that cooperation of any t members of the group is
sucient to retrieve the message. The sender carries out the following:
 randomly chooses an integer k and computes c = (
 1
)
k
(mod N),
 randomly forms a polynomial g(x) = a
0
+ a
1
x + : : :+ a
t 1
x
t 1
in GF (F )
such that g(0) = a
0
= 
h(m)
(mod N),
 computes for i = 1; : : : ; n
w
i
= y
ID
i
i
+ ID
i
(mod N)
s
i
= w
k
i
(mod N)
d
i
= g(s
i
)
e
i
= m  w
h(m)
i
(mod N)
and sends (t; c; d
i
; e
i
) to each U
i
.
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Decryption: Upon receiving the cryptogram, every group, A  P , of at least t
intended receivers can cooperate to retrieve the plaintext message m. That is,
each U
i
2 A rst calculates,
s
i
= c
x
i
(mod N);
and broadcasts the pair (d
i
; s
i
). When t values of such pairs are broadcasted, each
U
i
can recover v = 
h(m)
(mod N), which allows him to compute the plaintext
message as,
m = v
x
i
e
i
(mod N):
Conspiracy attack: The Susilo et al. [2] attack is as follows:
Let U
i
be a member of the group and let U
j
, who conspires with U
i
, be wanting
to join the group. U
j
chooses her secret key as x
j
= 2x
i
. Obviously, she is able
to convince the trusted authority of the knowledge of the relevant secret key and
thus she can obtain her public key as
y
j
= (
 2x
i
  ID
j
)
ID
 1
j
(mod N):
Now when an encrypted message is broadcast, U
i
and U
j
can calculate (this
is a simplied version of the calculation appearing in [2])
e
i
 e
i
e
j
=
m
2

 2x
i
h(m)
m
 2x
i
h(m)
=
m
2
m
= m (mod N)
which gives the message m without cooperating with other users.
We observe that the attack is eective if t  3 (otherwise every two parti-
cipants in the intended group are legitimate to decrypt the cryptogram) and both
users U
i
and U
j
are in the intended group (we would like to draw the attention
of the reader and authors of [2] to the fact that in group-oriented cryptographic
systems the membership of the intended group is chosen by the sender {for more
detail see [1]). However, we would like to acknowledge the authors of [2] for
pointing out this possible weakness in the scheme.
The modication: Clearly the attack is applicable because the requirement was
that the trusted authority must not know the users' secret key (see the original
paper for precise discussion regarding this matter). In the following we show a
small modication to the system that prevents this type of conspiracy attack and
preserves the characteristics of the system. The modication is applied to the
key generation phase.
The modied key generation: Every legitimate user, U
i
, chooses his initial secret
key x
i
, computes the shadow z = 
x
i
(mod N) and gives it to the authority. The
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trusted authority chooses a random value r
i
and gives it to U
i
. The secret value
of the user U
i
is now X
i
= x
i
+ r
i
and his shadow is
z
i
= z  
r
i
= 
x
i
+r
i
= 
X
i
(mod N):
After the authority is convinced that the user knows the secret key, he generates
the user's public key (the rest of the system remains at it was) as
y
i
= (z
 1
i
  ID
i
)
ID
 1
i
(mod N):
Note that the trusted authority still has no knowledge about the secret value
of any user and the system satises all requirements that have been discussed in
the original paper. In fact, the purpose of adding a random number to the initial
secret value chosen by users is to destroy possible structural relationships among
the secret values of users. It is not dicult to see that the secret values of users
now look like randomly chosen values and thus the conspiracy attack is no more
applicable to the system.
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